diff --git a/src/replication/config.rs b/src/replication/config.rs
index e2aec73..571c934 100644
--- a/src/replication/config.rs
+++ b/src/replication/config.rs
@@ -103,17 +103,18 @@ pub const MAX_CONCURRENT_REPLICATION_SENDS: usize = 3;
 
 /// Maximum number of concurrent in-flight audit-responder tasks.
 ///
-/// Subtree (round 1) and byte (round 2) challenge handlers are spawned off the
-/// serial replication message loop so their disk reads don't stall replication.
-/// This caps how many run at once across the engine, restoring backpressure: a
-/// peer flooding audit challenges cannot fan out unbounded `get_raw` reads or
-/// multi-MiB byte serves. When the cap is hit, the challenge is dropped — the
-/// auditor graces a non-response as a timeout, so honest auditors are
-/// unaffected and only a flooder is throttled. Sized to cover a handful of
-/// concurrent honest auditors (the per-peer gossip-audit cooldown is 30 min, so
-/// genuine concurrent audits are few) while bounding the byte round's worst-case
-/// resident bytes (`N × MAX_BYTE_CHALLENGE_KEYS × MAX_CHUNK_SIZE`).
-pub const MAX_CONCURRENT_AUDIT_RESPONSES: usize = 8;
+/// The responsible-chunk (audit #2), subtree (round 1), and byte (round 2)
+/// challenge handlers are all spawned off the serial replication message loop so
+/// their disk reads don't stall replication. This caps how many run at once
+/// across the engine, restoring backpressure: a peer flooding audit challenges
+/// cannot fan out unbounded `get_raw` reads or multi-MiB byte serves. When the
+/// cap is hit, the challenge is dropped — the auditor graces a non-response as a
+/// timeout, so honest auditors are unaffected and only a flooder is throttled.
+/// Sized to cover a handful of concurrent honest auditors (the per-peer
+/// gossip-audit cooldown is 30 min, so genuine concurrent audits are few) while
+/// bounding the byte round's worst-case resident bytes
+/// (`N × MAX_BYTE_CHALLENGE_KEYS × MAX_CHUNK_SIZE`).
+pub const MAX_CONCURRENT_AUDIT_RESPONSES: usize = 16;
 
 /// Maximum concurrent in-flight audit-responder tasks from any SINGLE peer.
 ///
diff --git a/src/replication/mod.rs b/src/replication/mod.rs
index b3d827d..0f6394a 100644
--- a/src/replication/mod.rs
+++ b/src/replication/mod.rs
@@ -1691,22 +1691,53 @@ async fn handle_replication_message(
             )
             .await
         }
-        ReplicationMessageBody::AuditChallenge(ref challenge) => {
+        ReplicationMessageBody::AuditChallenge(challenge) => {
             // Responsible-chunk audit (audit #2) responder: answer with per-key
             // possession digests. This same handler also answers the
             // prune-confirmation audit, which sends the same `AuditChallenge`
             // wire message.
+            //
+            // Answering digests the stored bytes of every challenged key, so —
+            // like the subtree/byte audits below — run it on a detached task off
+            // this serial message loop. Handling it inline lets one challenge
+            // block all other replication traffic until its digests complete
+            // (head-of-line blocking). The same flood-fair admission applies: a
+            // global ceiling AND a per-peer cap, dropping the challenge if either
+            // is hit (an honest auditor graces a non-response as a timeout, while
+            // a flooder is held to its per-peer share and cannot starve others).
+            let Some(guard) =
+                admit_audit_responder(audit_responder_semaphore, audit_responder_inflight, source)
+                    .await
+            else {
+                warn!(
+                    "Audit challenge reply not sent: kind=responsible response=dropped \
+                     source={source} (audit-responder capacity reached)"
+                );
+                return Ok(());
+            };
             let bootstrapping = *is_bootstrapping.read().await;
-            handle_audit_challenge_msg(
-                source,
-                challenge,
-                storage,
-                p2p_node,
-                bootstrapping,
-                msg.request_id,
-                rr_message_id,
-            )
-            .await
+            let storage = Arc::clone(storage);
+            let p2p_node = Arc::clone(p2p_node);
+            let source = *source;
+            let request_id = msg.request_id;
+            let rr_message_id = rr_message_id.map(ToOwned::to_owned);
+            tokio::spawn(async move {
+                let _guard = guard; // global permit + per-peer slot, held until done
+                if let Err(e) = handle_audit_challenge_msg(
+                    &source,
+                    &challenge,
+                    &storage,
+                    &p2p_node,
+                    bootstrapping,
+                    request_id,
+                    rr_message_id.as_deref(),
+                )
+                .await
+                {
+                    debug!("Audit challenge from {source} error: {e}");
+                }
+            });
+            Ok(())
         }
         ReplicationMessageBody::SubtreeAuditChallenge(challenge) => {
             // Gossip-triggered storage-bound subtree audit (ADR-0002). The