From 47ab37cadee2554eb24531f265f3dff744a75014 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Manish Gupta <manish@plane.so>
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 14:49:12 +0530
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] [SECUR-236] fix: harden pagination bounds and auth
 brute-force rate limiting

AppScan DAST remediation, ported from the plane-ee fix (#8591) and
re-verified against a live plane-ce instance.

- paginator: reject non-positive per_page (per_page=0 -> ZeroDivisionError ->
  HTTP 500) and bound the client-supplied cursor value/offset. The grouped
  paginators use cursor.value as the per-group page size: a negative value
  slices the queryset with a negative stop (ValueError -> HTTP 500) and a huge
  value fetches far more than max_per_page rows per group (cap bypass / DoS).
  One central guard in BasePaginator.paginate(); regression tests added.
- auth: sign-in/sign-up (app + space) were plain Views with no rate limiting.
  Add the IP-based AuthenticationThrottle check plus a per-account throttle
  keyed on the normalized email (AuthenticationAccountThrottle). The IP key is
  bypassable by spoofing X-Forwarded-For (NUM_PROXIES unset); the per-account
  limiter caps credential guessing against a single account regardless of IP.
- project serializer: mark created_by/updated_by read-only (fields="__all__"
  left them client-writable, allowing project ownership/attribution forgery).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 apps/api/plane/app/serializers/project.py     |  7 +-
 apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py   | 27 +++++-
 .../plane/authentication/views/app/email.py   | 35 ++++++++
 .../plane/authentication/views/space/email.py | 35 ++++++++
 .../plane/tests/unit/utils/test_paginator.py  | 86 +++++++++++++++++++
 apps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py             | 18 ++++
 6 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/apps/api/plane/app/serializers/project.py b/apps/api/plane/app/serializers/project.py
index aef296bc6c2..13e6e7e2e40 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/app/serializers/project.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/app/serializers/project.py
@@ -34,7 +34,12 @@ class ProjectSerializer(BaseSerializer):
     class Meta:
         model = Project
         fields = "__all__"
-        read_only_fields = ["workspace", "deleted_at"]
+        # created_by/updated_by are audit fields set server-side by BaseModel.save()
+        # from the request user; with fields="__all__" they are otherwise client-writable,
+        # letting a caller forge project ownership/attribution. save() only backfills
+        # created_by when it is None, so a supplied value would survive — mark them
+        # read-only so the client value is ignored.
+        read_only_fields = ["workspace", "deleted_at", "created_by", "updated_by"]
 
     def validate_name(self, name):
         project_id = self.instance.id if self.instance else None
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py
index bfadf82b702..86982968d9e 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 import os
 
 # Third party imports
-from rest_framework.throttling import AnonRateThrottle, UserRateThrottle
+from rest_framework.throttling import AnonRateThrottle, SimpleRateThrottle, UserRateThrottle
 from rest_framework import status
 from rest_framework.response import Response
 
@@ -49,6 +49,31 @@ def authentication_throttle_allows(request):
     return throttle.allow_request(request, None)
 
 
+class AuthenticationAccountThrottle(SimpleRateThrottle):
+    """Per-account (submitted email) authentication throttle.
+
+    AuthenticationThrottle keys on DRF get_ident, which honors X-Forwarded-For when
+    NUM_PROXIES is unset — an attacker can rotate that header to get a fresh bucket per
+    request and brute-force credentials unthrottled. Bucketing a second limiter by the
+    normalized email caps guesses against any single account regardless of source IP.
+    Email is normalized (strip + lower) to match the login lookup so casing tricks cannot
+    multiply the allowance; requests without an email fall back to the client identity.
+    """
+
+    scope = "authentication_account"
+    rate = os.environ.get("AUTHENTICATION_ACCOUNT_RATE_LIMIT", "5/minute")
+
+    def get_cache_key(self, request, view=None):
+        email = (request.POST.get("email") or "").strip().lower()
+        ident = f"email:{email}" if email else f"ip:{self.get_ident(request)}"
+        return self.cache_format % {"scope": self.scope, "ident": ident}
+
+
+def authentication_account_throttle_allows(request):
+    """Per-account counterpart to authentication_throttle_allows (see above)."""
+    return AuthenticationAccountThrottle().allow_request(request, None)
+
+
 class EmailVerificationThrottle(UserRateThrottle):
     """
     Throttle for email verification code generation.
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.py
index 3d1954875c4..7b0aa00a5d4 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.py
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
 
 # Module imports
 from plane.authentication.provider.credentials.email import EmailProvider
+from plane.authentication.rate_limit import (
+    authentication_throttle_allows,
+    authentication_account_throttle_allows,
+)
 from plane.authentication.utils.login import user_login
 from plane.license.models import Instance
 from plane.authentication.utils.host import base_host
@@ -26,6 +30,22 @@
 class SignInAuthEndpoint(View):
     def post(self, request):
         next_path = request.POST.get("next_path")
+
+        # Rate-limit password sign-in per IP to prevent credential brute-force.
+        # This is a plain django View, so DRF throttle_classes do not apply and
+        # the throttle must be invoked manually (as in the magic-link endpoints).
+        if not authentication_throttle_allows(request) or not authentication_account_throttle_allows(request):
+            exc = AuthenticationException(
+                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"],
+                error_message="RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED",
+            )
+            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
+                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_app=True),
+                next_path=next_path,
+                params=exc.get_error_dict(),
+            )
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+
         # Check instance configuration
         instance = Instance.objects.first()
         if instance is None or not instance.is_setup_done:
@@ -135,6 +155,21 @@ def post(self, request):
 class SignUpAuthEndpoint(View):
     def post(self, request):
         next_path = request.POST.get("next_path")
+
+        # Rate-limit password sign-up per IP to prevent automated abuse,
+        # mirroring the sign-in path and the magic-link endpoints.
+        if not authentication_throttle_allows(request) or not authentication_account_throttle_allows(request):
+            exc = AuthenticationException(
+                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"],
+                error_message="RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED",
+            )
+            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
+                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_app=True),
+                next_path=next_path,
+                params=exc.get_error_dict(),
+            )
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+
         # Check instance configuration
         instance = Instance.objects.first()
         if instance is None or not instance.is_setup_done:
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py
index 827348cef23..a2afe87f871 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
 
 # Module imports
 from plane.authentication.provider.credentials.email import EmailProvider
+from plane.authentication.rate_limit import (
+    authentication_throttle_allows,
+    authentication_account_throttle_allows,
+)
 from plane.authentication.utils.login import user_login
 from plane.license.models import Instance
 from plane.authentication.utils.host import base_host
@@ -25,6 +29,22 @@
 class SignInAuthSpaceEndpoint(View):
     def post(self, request):
         next_path = request.POST.get("next_path")
+
+        # Rate-limit password sign-in per IP to prevent credential brute-force.
+        # Plain django View → DRF throttle_classes do not apply, so invoke the
+        # throttle manually (as in the magic-link endpoints).
+        if not authentication_throttle_allows(request) or not authentication_account_throttle_allows(request):
+            exc = AuthenticationException(
+                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"],
+                error_message="RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED",
+            )
+            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
+                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_space=True),
+                next_path=next_path,
+                params=exc.get_error_dict(),
+            )
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+
         # Check instance configuration
         instance = Instance.objects.first()
         if instance is None or not instance.is_setup_done:
@@ -110,6 +130,21 @@ def post(self, request):
 class SignUpAuthSpaceEndpoint(View):
     def post(self, request):
         next_path = request.POST.get("next_path")
+
+        # Rate-limit password sign-up per IP to prevent automated abuse,
+        # mirroring the sign-in path and the magic-link endpoints.
+        if not authentication_throttle_allows(request) or not authentication_account_throttle_allows(request):
+            exc = AuthenticationException(
+                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"],
+                error_message="RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED",
+            )
+            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
+                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_space=True),
+                next_path=next_path,
+                params=exc.get_error_dict(),
+            )
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+
         # Check instance configuration
         instance = Instance.objects.first()
         if instance is None or not instance.is_setup_done:
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/utils/test_paginator.py b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/utils/test_paginator.py
index b249f4d184b..00ec8ccfca6 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/utils/test_paginator.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/utils/test_paginator.py
@@ -121,3 +121,89 @@ def test_no_group_by_is_unaffected(self):
             paginator_cls=_StubGroupedPaginator,
         )
         assert response.data["grouped_by"] is None
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestGetPerPageBounds:
+    """get_per_page() must reject non-positive per_page before it reaches the
+    paginator. A per_page of 0 divides by zero in math.ceil(count / limit) and
+    a negative per_page slices the queryset with garbage bounds — both would
+    otherwise surface as an unhandled HTTP 500 (flagged by AppScan as
+    "Integer Overflow" on the stickies per_page parameter)."""
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("per_page", ["0", "-1", "-1000"])
+    def test_non_positive_per_page_raises_parse_error(self, per_page):
+        request = _make_request(per_page=per_page)
+        with pytest.raises(ParseError):
+            BasePaginator().get_per_page(request)
+
+    def test_over_max_per_page_still_rejected(self):
+        request = _make_request(per_page="5000")
+        with pytest.raises(ParseError):
+            BasePaginator().get_per_page(request, default_per_page=20, max_per_page=1000)
+
+    def test_non_integer_per_page_raises_parse_error(self):
+        request = _make_request(per_page="abc")
+        with pytest.raises(ParseError):
+            BasePaginator().get_per_page(request)
+
+    def test_valid_per_page_passes_through(self):
+        request = _make_request(per_page="30")
+        assert BasePaginator().get_per_page(request, default_per_page=20, max_per_page=1000) == 30
+
+    def test_per_page_of_one_is_allowed(self):
+        # The exact lower boundary must be accepted.
+        request = _make_request(per_page="1")
+        assert BasePaginator().get_per_page(request) == 1
+
+
+class _ExplodingPaginator:
+    """Fails if constructed — proves the cursor guard rejects BEFORE any paginator runs."""
+
+    def __init__(self, **kwargs):
+        raise AssertionError("paginator_cls must not be constructed for an invalid cursor")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestCursorBounds:
+    """paginate() must reject an out-of-bounds client cursor before it drives slicing.
+
+    The grouped paginators use cursor.value as the per-group page size
+    (stop = offset + (cursor.value or limit) + 1). A negative value slices the queryset
+    with a negative stop -> ValueError('Negative indexing is not supported') -> HTTP 500;
+    a huge value fetches far more than max_per_page rows per group (cap bypass / DoS).
+    cursor.offset must be non-negative."""
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("cursor", ["-1:0:0", "1000000:0:0", "20:-1:0"])
+    def test_out_of_bounds_cursor_rejected_before_paginator(self, cursor):
+        request = _make_request(cursor=cursor)
+        with pytest.raises(ParseError):
+            BasePaginator().paginate(
+                request=request,
+                queryset=None,
+                paginator_cls=_ExplodingPaginator,
+                default_per_page=20,
+                max_per_page=1000,
+            )
+
+    def test_valid_cursor_passes_the_guard(self):
+        request = _make_request(cursor="20:0:0")
+        response = BasePaginator().paginate(
+            request=request,
+            queryset=None,
+            paginator_cls=_StubGroupedPaginator,
+            default_per_page=20,
+            max_per_page=1000,
+        )
+        assert response.data["results"] == []
+
+    def test_cursor_value_at_max_is_allowed(self):
+        request = _make_request(cursor="1000:0:0")
+        response = BasePaginator().paginate(
+            request=request,
+            queryset=None,
+            paginator_cls=_StubGroupedPaginator,
+            default_per_page=20,
+            max_per_page=1000,
+        )
+        assert response.data["results"] == []
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py b/apps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py
index 2082041f1ac..a10a69978bc 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py
@@ -646,6 +646,13 @@ def get_per_page(self, request, default_per_page=1000, max_per_page=1000):
         except ValueError:
             raise ParseError(detail="Invalid per_page parameter.")
 
+        # Reject non-positive values before they reach the paginator, where a
+        # zero limit divides by zero in math.ceil(count / limit) and a negative
+        # limit slices the queryset with garbage bounds — both surface as an
+        # unhandled HTTP 500 instead of a clean client error.
+        if per_page < 1:
+            raise ParseError(detail="Invalid per_page value. Must be at least 1.")
+
         max_per_page = max(max_per_page, default_per_page)
         if per_page > max_per_page:
             raise ParseError(detail=f"Invalid per_page value. Cannot exceed {max_per_page}.")
@@ -680,6 +687,17 @@ def paginate(
         except ValueError:
             raise ParseError(detail="Invalid cursor parameter.")
 
+        # Bound the client-supplied cursor before it drives any slicing. The grouped
+        # paginators use cursor.value as the per-group page size
+        # (stop = offset + (cursor.value or limit) + 1). Left unbounded, a negative value
+        # slices the queryset with a negative stop -> "Negative indexing is not supported"
+        # (HTTP 500), and a huge value fetches far more than max_per_page rows per group
+        # (max_per_page cap bypass / resource-exhaustion DoS). cursor.offset is the page
+        # index and must be non-negative.
+        effective_max_per_page = max(max_per_page, default_per_page)
+        if not (0 <= input_cursor.value <= effective_max_per_page) or input_cursor.offset < 0:
+            raise ParseError(detail="Invalid cursor parameter.")
+
         if not paginator:
             if group_by_field_name:
                 # Validate against the allowlist before the field name reaches

From 3257ee9305fc14f893a55325c0c4d36615d82c11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Manish Gupta <manish@plane.so>
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 15:12:13 +0530
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] =?UTF-8?q?[SECUR-236]=20fix:=20address=20CodeRabbit?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20=E2=80=94=20composite=20account=20throttle=20key=20+=20rate?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20guard?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

- AuthenticationAccountThrottle keyed on (email + client IP) instead of email
  alone. An email-only key let anyone lock a victim out of their own account by
  spamming their address from other IPs (self-inflicted lockout DoS). Combining
  with the client IP prevents that while still capping single-source guessing.
- Guard the AUTHENTICATION_ACCOUNT_RATE_LIMIT env value: a malformed rate would
  raise in DRF parse_rate() on every auth POST (throttle is instantiated per
  request), taking authentication down instance-wide. Falls back to the default.
- Add regression tests for both.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py   | 42 +++++++++++----
 .../tests/unit/authentication/__init__.py     |  0
 .../unit/authentication/test_rate_limit.py    | 54 +++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/__init__.py
 create mode 100644 apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_rate_limit.py

diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py
index 86982968d9e..a35a074525d 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py
@@ -49,23 +49,45 @@ def authentication_throttle_allows(request):
     return throttle.allow_request(request, None)
 
 
+def _valid_rate_or_default(value, default):
+    """Return `value` only if it is a well-formed DRF throttle rate ("<num>/<period>"),
+    else `default`. SimpleRateThrottle.parse_rate() raises on a malformed rate, and the
+    throttle is instantiated on every auth POST — an unvalidated env value would take
+    authentication down instance-wide. Falling back to the default keeps auth up.
+    """
+    try:
+        num, period = value.split("/")
+        int(num)
+        if period[:1] not in ("s", "m", "h", "d"):
+            raise ValueError
+    except (ValueError, AttributeError):
+        return default
+    return value
+
+
 class AuthenticationAccountThrottle(SimpleRateThrottle):
-    """Per-account (submitted email) authentication throttle.
-
-    AuthenticationThrottle keys on DRF get_ident, which honors X-Forwarded-For when
-    NUM_PROXIES is unset — an attacker can rotate that header to get a fresh bucket per
-    request and brute-force credentials unthrottled. Bucketing a second limiter by the
-    normalized email caps guesses against any single account regardless of source IP.
-    Email is normalized (strip + lower) to match the login lookup so casing tricks cannot
-    multiply the allowance; requests without an email fall back to the client identity.
+    """Per-(account, client-IP) authentication throttle.
+
+    Supplements the IP-only AuthenticationThrottle by also bucketing on the normalized
+    submitted email, capping rapid credential guessing against a single account from a
+    given source. The key combines email AND client IP on purpose: keying on email alone
+    would let anyone lock a victim out of their own account by spamming their address from
+    other IPs (self-inflicted account-lockout DoS). Email is normalized (strip + lower) to
+    match the login lookup so casing tricks cannot multiply the allowance; requests without
+    an email fall back to the client identity only.
+
+    NOTE: this does not by itself stop a spoofed-source distributed brute force — that
+    requires a trustworthy client IP (configure NUM_PROXIES / the proxy so X-Forwarded-For
+    cannot be forged). It is defense-in-depth alongside that deployment control.
     """
 
     scope = "authentication_account"
-    rate = os.environ.get("AUTHENTICATION_ACCOUNT_RATE_LIMIT", "5/minute")
+    rate = _valid_rate_or_default(os.environ.get("AUTHENTICATION_ACCOUNT_RATE_LIMIT", "5/minute"), "5/minute")
 
     def get_cache_key(self, request, view=None):
+        ip = self.get_ident(request)
         email = (request.POST.get("email") or "").strip().lower()
-        ident = f"email:{email}" if email else f"ip:{self.get_ident(request)}"
+        ident = f"email:{email}|ip:{ip}" if email else f"ip:{ip}"
         return self.cache_format % {"scope": self.scope, "ident": ident}
 
 
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/__init__.py b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/__init__.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e69de29bb2d
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_rate_limit.py b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_rate_limit.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..7b62242146a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_rate_limit.py
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+# See the LICENSE file for details.
+
+import pytest
+from django.test import RequestFactory
+
+from plane.authentication.rate_limit import (
+    AuthenticationAccountThrottle,
+    _valid_rate_or_default,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestValidRateOrDefault:
+    """A malformed AUTHENTICATION_ACCOUNT_RATE_LIMIT must not crash auth: the throttle is
+    built on every sign-in POST, and DRF parse_rate() raises on a bad rate. Guard falls
+    back to the default so authentication stays up."""
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad", ["", "bad//x", "10/xyz", "abc/m", "5", "5/", None])
+    def test_malformed_falls_back_to_default(self, bad):
+        assert _valid_rate_or_default(bad, "5/minute") == "5/minute"
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("good", ["3/m", "5/minute", "10/h", "1/s", "100/d"])
+    def test_valid_rate_passes_through(self, good):
+        assert _valid_rate_or_default(good, "5/minute") == good
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestAccountThrottleCacheKey:
+    """The per-account throttle keys on email AND client IP. Keying on email alone would
+    let anyone lock a victim out of their own account by spamming their address from other
+    IPs; combining with the client IP prevents that self-inflicted lockout DoS."""
+
+    def _request(self, remote_addr, **post):
+        request = RequestFactory().post("/auth/sign-in/", data=post)
+        request.META["REMOTE_ADDR"] = remote_addr
+        return request
+
+    def test_key_combines_normalized_email_and_ip(self):
+        key = AuthenticationAccountThrottle().get_cache_key(self._request("10.0.0.1", email="Victim@Example.COM "))
+        assert "email:victim@example.com" in key  # normalized (strip + lower)
+        assert "ip:10.0.0.1" in key
+
+    def test_same_email_different_ip_yields_different_buckets(self):
+        throttle = AuthenticationAccountThrottle()
+        k1 = throttle.get_cache_key(self._request("1.1.1.1", email="v@example.com"))
+        k2 = throttle.get_cache_key(self._request("2.2.2.2", email="v@example.com"))
+        assert k1 != k2  # an attacker on another IP cannot consume the victim's bucket
+
+    def test_no_email_falls_back_to_ip_only(self):
+        key = AuthenticationAccountThrottle().get_cache_key(self._request("9.9.9.9"))
+        assert "ip:9.9.9.9" in key
+        assert "email:" not in key

From 687483ea79c4100bb85e13cd661c45ae3c955cb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Manish Gupta <manish@plane.so>
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 15:31:40 +0530
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] chore: add copyright header to authentication test
 package __init__

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/__init__.py | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/__init__.py b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/__init__.py
index e69de29bb2d..fcc34a703d7 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/__init__.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/__init__.py
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+# See the LICENSE file for details.

From 6bc666abdb8a79ca8428580fb71e9f59df56e893 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Manish Gupta <manish@plane.so>
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 18:05:30 +0530
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] [SECUR-236] chore: drop overlapping per_page + auth
 fixes, defer to #9429 / #9335

Two parts of this PR fully overlapped existing open PRs against preview, so per
the "drop the most recent on full overlap" call they are removed here:

- per_page non-positive guard (get_per_page) -> covered identically by #9429.
- password sign-in/sign-up rate limiting -> covered (more cleanly, via a
  decorator) by #9335 (GHSA-349j-pjw5-67q4). Reverted rate_limit.py and
  email.py (app + space) and removed the auth unit tests.

This PR now carries only its unique, non-overlapping fixes:
- grouped-paginator cursor bound in paginate() (cap-bypass DoS + negative-slice
  500 that #9429 does not address), with TestCursorBounds.
- Project created_by/updated_by read-only (mass-assignment).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py   | 49 +----------------
 .../plane/authentication/views/app/email.py   | 35 ------------
 .../plane/authentication/views/space/email.py | 35 ------------
 .../tests/unit/authentication/__init__.py     |  3 --
 .../unit/authentication/test_rate_limit.py    | 54 -------------------
 .../plane/tests/unit/utils/test_paginator.py  | 34 ------------
 apps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py             |  7 ---
 7 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 216 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/__init__.py
 delete mode 100644 apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_rate_limit.py

diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py
index a35a074525d..bfadf82b702 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/rate_limit.py
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 import os
 
 # Third party imports
-from rest_framework.throttling import AnonRateThrottle, SimpleRateThrottle, UserRateThrottle
+from rest_framework.throttling import AnonRateThrottle, UserRateThrottle
 from rest_framework import status
 from rest_framework.response import Response
 
@@ -49,53 +49,6 @@ def authentication_throttle_allows(request):
     return throttle.allow_request(request, None)
 
 
-def _valid_rate_or_default(value, default):
-    """Return `value` only if it is a well-formed DRF throttle rate ("<num>/<period>"),
-    else `default`. SimpleRateThrottle.parse_rate() raises on a malformed rate, and the
-    throttle is instantiated on every auth POST — an unvalidated env value would take
-    authentication down instance-wide. Falling back to the default keeps auth up.
-    """
-    try:
-        num, period = value.split("/")
-        int(num)
-        if period[:1] not in ("s", "m", "h", "d"):
-            raise ValueError
-    except (ValueError, AttributeError):
-        return default
-    return value
-
-
-class AuthenticationAccountThrottle(SimpleRateThrottle):
-    """Per-(account, client-IP) authentication throttle.
-
-    Supplements the IP-only AuthenticationThrottle by also bucketing on the normalized
-    submitted email, capping rapid credential guessing against a single account from a
-    given source. The key combines email AND client IP on purpose: keying on email alone
-    would let anyone lock a victim out of their own account by spamming their address from
-    other IPs (self-inflicted account-lockout DoS). Email is normalized (strip + lower) to
-    match the login lookup so casing tricks cannot multiply the allowance; requests without
-    an email fall back to the client identity only.
-
-    NOTE: this does not by itself stop a spoofed-source distributed brute force — that
-    requires a trustworthy client IP (configure NUM_PROXIES / the proxy so X-Forwarded-For
-    cannot be forged). It is defense-in-depth alongside that deployment control.
-    """
-
-    scope = "authentication_account"
-    rate = _valid_rate_or_default(os.environ.get("AUTHENTICATION_ACCOUNT_RATE_LIMIT", "5/minute"), "5/minute")
-
-    def get_cache_key(self, request, view=None):
-        ip = self.get_ident(request)
-        email = (request.POST.get("email") or "").strip().lower()
-        ident = f"email:{email}|ip:{ip}" if email else f"ip:{ip}"
-        return self.cache_format % {"scope": self.scope, "ident": ident}
-
-
-def authentication_account_throttle_allows(request):
-    """Per-account counterpart to authentication_throttle_allows (see above)."""
-    return AuthenticationAccountThrottle().allow_request(request, None)
-
-
 class EmailVerificationThrottle(UserRateThrottle):
     """
     Throttle for email verification code generation.
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.py
index 7b0aa00a5d4..3d1954875c4 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/email.py
@@ -10,10 +10,6 @@
 
 # Module imports
 from plane.authentication.provider.credentials.email import EmailProvider
-from plane.authentication.rate_limit import (
-    authentication_throttle_allows,
-    authentication_account_throttle_allows,
-)
 from plane.authentication.utils.login import user_login
 from plane.license.models import Instance
 from plane.authentication.utils.host import base_host
@@ -30,22 +26,6 @@
 class SignInAuthEndpoint(View):
     def post(self, request):
         next_path = request.POST.get("next_path")
-
-        # Rate-limit password sign-in per IP to prevent credential brute-force.
-        # This is a plain django View, so DRF throttle_classes do not apply and
-        # the throttle must be invoked manually (as in the magic-link endpoints).
-        if not authentication_throttle_allows(request) or not authentication_account_throttle_allows(request):
-            exc = AuthenticationException(
-                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"],
-                error_message="RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED",
-            )
-            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
-                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_app=True),
-                next_path=next_path,
-                params=exc.get_error_dict(),
-            )
-            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
-
         # Check instance configuration
         instance = Instance.objects.first()
         if instance is None or not instance.is_setup_done:
@@ -155,21 +135,6 @@ def post(self, request):
 class SignUpAuthEndpoint(View):
     def post(self, request):
         next_path = request.POST.get("next_path")
-
-        # Rate-limit password sign-up per IP to prevent automated abuse,
-        # mirroring the sign-in path and the magic-link endpoints.
-        if not authentication_throttle_allows(request) or not authentication_account_throttle_allows(request):
-            exc = AuthenticationException(
-                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"],
-                error_message="RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED",
-            )
-            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
-                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_app=True),
-                next_path=next_path,
-                params=exc.get_error_dict(),
-            )
-            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
-
         # Check instance configuration
         instance = Instance.objects.first()
         if instance is None or not instance.is_setup_done:
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py
index a2afe87f871..827348cef23 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py
@@ -11,10 +11,6 @@
 
 # Module imports
 from plane.authentication.provider.credentials.email import EmailProvider
-from plane.authentication.rate_limit import (
-    authentication_throttle_allows,
-    authentication_account_throttle_allows,
-)
 from plane.authentication.utils.login import user_login
 from plane.license.models import Instance
 from plane.authentication.utils.host import base_host
@@ -29,22 +25,6 @@
 class SignInAuthSpaceEndpoint(View):
     def post(self, request):
         next_path = request.POST.get("next_path")
-
-        # Rate-limit password sign-in per IP to prevent credential brute-force.
-        # Plain django View → DRF throttle_classes do not apply, so invoke the
-        # throttle manually (as in the magic-link endpoints).
-        if not authentication_throttle_allows(request) or not authentication_account_throttle_allows(request):
-            exc = AuthenticationException(
-                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"],
-                error_message="RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED",
-            )
-            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
-                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_space=True),
-                next_path=next_path,
-                params=exc.get_error_dict(),
-            )
-            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
-
         # Check instance configuration
         instance = Instance.objects.first()
         if instance is None or not instance.is_setup_done:
@@ -130,21 +110,6 @@ def post(self, request):
 class SignUpAuthSpaceEndpoint(View):
     def post(self, request):
         next_path = request.POST.get("next_path")
-
-        # Rate-limit password sign-up per IP to prevent automated abuse,
-        # mirroring the sign-in path and the magic-link endpoints.
-        if not authentication_throttle_allows(request) or not authentication_account_throttle_allows(request):
-            exc = AuthenticationException(
-                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"],
-                error_message="RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED",
-            )
-            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
-                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_space=True),
-                next_path=next_path,
-                params=exc.get_error_dict(),
-            )
-            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
-
         # Check instance configuration
         instance = Instance.objects.first()
         if instance is None or not instance.is_setup_done:
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/__init__.py b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/__init__.py
deleted file mode 100644
index fcc34a703d7..00000000000
--- a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/__init__.py
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
-# See the LICENSE file for details.
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_rate_limit.py b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_rate_limit.py
deleted file mode 100644
index 7b62242146a..00000000000
--- a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_rate_limit.py
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
-# See the LICENSE file for details.
-
-import pytest
-from django.test import RequestFactory
-
-from plane.authentication.rate_limit import (
-    AuthenticationAccountThrottle,
-    _valid_rate_or_default,
-)
-
-
-@pytest.mark.unit
-class TestValidRateOrDefault:
-    """A malformed AUTHENTICATION_ACCOUNT_RATE_LIMIT must not crash auth: the throttle is
-    built on every sign-in POST, and DRF parse_rate() raises on a bad rate. Guard falls
-    back to the default so authentication stays up."""
-
-    @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad", ["", "bad//x", "10/xyz", "abc/m", "5", "5/", None])
-    def test_malformed_falls_back_to_default(self, bad):
-        assert _valid_rate_or_default(bad, "5/minute") == "5/minute"
-
-    @pytest.mark.parametrize("good", ["3/m", "5/minute", "10/h", "1/s", "100/d"])
-    def test_valid_rate_passes_through(self, good):
-        assert _valid_rate_or_default(good, "5/minute") == good
-
-
-@pytest.mark.unit
-class TestAccountThrottleCacheKey:
-    """The per-account throttle keys on email AND client IP. Keying on email alone would
-    let anyone lock a victim out of their own account by spamming their address from other
-    IPs; combining with the client IP prevents that self-inflicted lockout DoS."""
-
-    def _request(self, remote_addr, **post):
-        request = RequestFactory().post("/auth/sign-in/", data=post)
-        request.META["REMOTE_ADDR"] = remote_addr
-        return request
-
-    def test_key_combines_normalized_email_and_ip(self):
-        key = AuthenticationAccountThrottle().get_cache_key(self._request("10.0.0.1", email="Victim@Example.COM "))
-        assert "email:victim@example.com" in key  # normalized (strip + lower)
-        assert "ip:10.0.0.1" in key
-
-    def test_same_email_different_ip_yields_different_buckets(self):
-        throttle = AuthenticationAccountThrottle()
-        k1 = throttle.get_cache_key(self._request("1.1.1.1", email="v@example.com"))
-        k2 = throttle.get_cache_key(self._request("2.2.2.2", email="v@example.com"))
-        assert k1 != k2  # an attacker on another IP cannot consume the victim's bucket
-
-    def test_no_email_falls_back_to_ip_only(self):
-        key = AuthenticationAccountThrottle().get_cache_key(self._request("9.9.9.9"))
-        assert "ip:9.9.9.9" in key
-        assert "email:" not in key
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/utils/test_paginator.py b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/utils/test_paginator.py
index 00ec8ccfca6..2e2b6a60ec8 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/utils/test_paginator.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/utils/test_paginator.py
@@ -123,40 +123,6 @@ def test_no_group_by_is_unaffected(self):
         assert response.data["grouped_by"] is None
 
 
-@pytest.mark.unit
-class TestGetPerPageBounds:
-    """get_per_page() must reject non-positive per_page before it reaches the
-    paginator. A per_page of 0 divides by zero in math.ceil(count / limit) and
-    a negative per_page slices the queryset with garbage bounds — both would
-    otherwise surface as an unhandled HTTP 500 (flagged by AppScan as
-    "Integer Overflow" on the stickies per_page parameter)."""
-
-    @pytest.mark.parametrize("per_page", ["0", "-1", "-1000"])
-    def test_non_positive_per_page_raises_parse_error(self, per_page):
-        request = _make_request(per_page=per_page)
-        with pytest.raises(ParseError):
-            BasePaginator().get_per_page(request)
-
-    def test_over_max_per_page_still_rejected(self):
-        request = _make_request(per_page="5000")
-        with pytest.raises(ParseError):
-            BasePaginator().get_per_page(request, default_per_page=20, max_per_page=1000)
-
-    def test_non_integer_per_page_raises_parse_error(self):
-        request = _make_request(per_page="abc")
-        with pytest.raises(ParseError):
-            BasePaginator().get_per_page(request)
-
-    def test_valid_per_page_passes_through(self):
-        request = _make_request(per_page="30")
-        assert BasePaginator().get_per_page(request, default_per_page=20, max_per_page=1000) == 30
-
-    def test_per_page_of_one_is_allowed(self):
-        # The exact lower boundary must be accepted.
-        request = _make_request(per_page="1")
-        assert BasePaginator().get_per_page(request) == 1
-
-
 class _ExplodingPaginator:
     """Fails if constructed — proves the cursor guard rejects BEFORE any paginator runs."""
 
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py b/apps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py
index a10a69978bc..3ff29213834 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/utils/paginator.py
@@ -646,13 +646,6 @@ def get_per_page(self, request, default_per_page=1000, max_per_page=1000):
         except ValueError:
             raise ParseError(detail="Invalid per_page parameter.")
 
-        # Reject non-positive values before they reach the paginator, where a
-        # zero limit divides by zero in math.ceil(count / limit) and a negative
-        # limit slices the queryset with garbage bounds — both surface as an
-        # unhandled HTTP 500 instead of a clean client error.
-        if per_page < 1:
-            raise ParseError(detail="Invalid per_page value. Must be at least 1.")
-
         max_per_page = max(max_per_page, default_per_page)
         if per_page > max_per_page:
             raise ParseError(detail=f"Invalid per_page value. Cannot exceed {max_per_page}.")