fix(sdk-coin-stx): verify recipient and amount in native STX verifyTransaction

[bitgo-ai-agent-dev]

What

• Stx.verifyTransaction previously returned true after checking only that the recipient count was ≤ 1 — no address or amount comparison was performed.
• Added full decode-and-compare logic ported from Sip10Token.verifyTransaction:
  • Decodes the prebuild txHex via explainTransaction
  • Compares the decoded recipient address (memoId stripped) and amount against txParams.recipients
  • Compares the memo (from txParams.memo or embedded in recipient address) against the decoded transaction memo
  • Validates total output amount matches the declared total
• Added getMemoIdAndBaseAddressFromAddress import from existing utils
• Added lodash import (already a listed dependency) for _.isEqual
• Added 8 new unit tests covering: valid match, wrong address, wrong amount, wrong memo, missing txHex, and multiple recipients

Why

• A compromised platform prebuild could redirect native STX sends to any address or alter the amount, and the local verifyTransaction would still return true without detecting the mismatch.
• The SIP10 token path already had full recipient validation; this gap was specific to native STX.
• This is a security fix required by the Claude Security scan (High severity).

Test plan

• All 180 existing unit tests pass (cd modules/sdk-coin-stx && mocha)
• New tests verify correct recipient/amount match returns true
• New tests verify wrong address, wrong amount, wrong memo all throw descriptive errors
• New test verifies missing txHex in prebuild throws an error
• TypeScript compilation succeeds for sdk-coin-stx with no new errors

Ticket: CSHLD-839

[linear-code]

CSHLD-839

[prajwalu142]

@claude review this pr for potential regressions and provide verdict

[github-actions]

Claude finished @prajwalu142's task —— View job

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PR Review for STX verifyTransaction Security Fix

Tasks:

• Read and analyze the modified stx.ts implementation
• Review the new unit tests for completeness
• Check for potential breaking changes or regressions
• Verify the security fix implementation
• Provide final verdict

Review Summary

This PR addresses a critical security vulnerability in the STX verifyTransaction method. The fix is well-implemented and necessary.

✅ VERDICT: APPROVE

This PR should be merged - it fixes a high-severity security issue without introducing regressions.

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Detailed Analysis

Security Fix Quality

Excellent - The implementation properly validates:

• ✅ Recipient addresses (with memo ID stripping via getMemoIdAndBaseAddressFromAddress)
• ✅ Transaction amounts (converted to BigInt for accurate comparison)
• ✅ Memo fields (from both txParams.memo and embedded in addresses)
• ✅ Total output amount validation

Implementation Assessment

Code Quality: Good

• Uses proper deep equality checking with lodash.isEqual
• Handles memo extraction from both explicit memo field and address-embedded memoIds
• Consistent error messaging
• Follows existing code patterns

Dependencies: Safe

• lodash is already a dependency in the project
• getMemoIdAndBaseAddressFromAddress is an existing utility function

Test Coverage

Comprehensive - 8 new tests cover:

• ✅ Valid matching recipient/amount/memo
• ✅ Wrong recipient address
• ✅ Wrong amount
• ✅ Wrong memo
• ✅ Missing txHex validation
• ✅ Memo passed in recipient address
• ✅ Multiple recipients rejection

Regression Analysis

No Breaking Changes Detected:

• Method signature unchanged (VerifyTransactionOptions → Promise<boolean>)
• Existing validation logic preserved (multiple recipients check)
• New validation only adds security without removing functionality
• Early returns maintain existing behavior for edge cases

Performance Impact

Minimal - One additional explainTransaction call per verification, which is acceptable for the security benefit gained.

Minor Observations

• CHANGELOG.md had significant formatting changes (243 lines removed) - appears to be cleanup, not functionality related
• Code follows repository conventions and TypeScript best practices

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This security fix is essential and ready for production deployment.

[Ranjna-G]

please make sure to bump this in bg-25 and old ui