Only the latest minor version receives security updates.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.2.x | ✅ |
| < 0.2 | ❌ |
These hooks run with your full shell privileges, like any other Claude Code hook.
What they do: read .md and .tsv files under .claude/jit-context/, read the JSON that
Claude Code pipes to them on stdin, write a timing log under
.claude/jit-context/.discovery/logs/, and write session marker files under /tmp.
What they never do: make network requests, execute anything from a rule file, or write outside those two locations. A rule file is injected as text; it is never evaluated.
Two things worth knowing:
- Rule content becomes model context. Anyone who can write to
.claude/jit-context/can put text in front of your agent on the next matching prompt. Treat that directory with the same review discipline asCLAUDE.md— in practice, review rule files in pull requests like any other code. blockmode is a guardrail, not a security boundary. It stops a tool call that matches a pattern. It is there to catch mistakes, not to contain an adversary.
Session markers live in /tmp/claude-*-shown-$PPID.txt. On a shared machine these are
world-readable by default and reveal which rule files fired — filenames only, never
content.
Do not open public GitHub issues for security vulnerabilities.
Email fdavid@digitalprocesstools.com with:
- A description of the issue
- Steps to reproduce
- Affected version (see
.claude-plugin/plugin.json) - Impact assessment if known
You can expect an acknowledgment within 7 days. We will work with you to understand and resolve the issue, and credit you in the release notes if desired.