Lab 1 submission

PS C:\Users\minim\projects\DevOps-Intro\app> curl.exe -s http://localhost:8080/health | python -m json.tool

{

"notes": 4,

"status": "ok"

}

PS C:\Users\minim\projects\DevOps-Intro\app> curl.exe -s http://localhost:8080/notes | python -m json.tool

[

{

"id": 1,

"title": "Welcome to QuickNotes",

"body": "This is the project you'll containerize, deploy, monitor, and harden across all 10 labs.",

"created_at": "2026-01-15T10:00:00Z"

},

{

"id": 2,

"title": "Read app/main.go first",

"body": "Start by understanding the entry point ??? env vars, signal handling, graceful shutdown.",

"created_at": "2026-01-15T10:05:00Z"

},

{

"id": 3,

"title": "DevOps mantra",

"body": "If it hurts, do it more often.",

"created_at": "2026-01-15T10:10:00Z"

},

{

"id": 4,

"title": "Endpoint cheat-sheet",

"body": "GET /notes GET /notes/{id} POST /notes DELETE /notes/{id} GET /health GET /metrics",

"created_at": "2026-01-15T10:15:00Z"

}

]

PS C:\Users\minim\projects\DevOps-Intro\app> '{"title":"hello","body":"first POST"}' | Set-Content -NoNewline -Encoding ASCII .\note.json

PS C:\Users\minim\projects\DevOps-Intro\app> Get-Content .\note.json

{"title":"hello","body":"first POST"}

PS C:\Users\minim\projects\DevOps-Intro\app> curl.exe -s -X POST "http://localhost:8080/notes" `

-H "Content-Type: application/json" `

--data-binary "@note.json" | python -m json.tool

{

"id": 5,

"title": "hello",

"body": "first POST",

"created_at": "2026-06-03T23:53:54.212023Z"

}

PS C:\Users\minim\projects\DevOps-Intro\app> git log --show-signature -1

commit f65098490b121b04b0f3f8149d605c02b1fbf2ee (HEAD -> feature/lab1)

Good "git" signature for m.mifsudbonici@qdeep.net with ED25519 key SHA256:BYnjQCewIJlPo99DT0FmCjek0kH6RojxB09YF9ynV4o

Author: Maximilian Mifsud Bonici m.mifsudbonici@qdeep.net

Date: Thu Jun 4 03:02:35 2026 +0300

docs(lab1): start submission

Signed-off-by: Maximilian Mifsud Bonici m.mifsudbonici@qdeep.net

Signed commits matter because they prove a commit really came from the key-holder and was not quietly swapped or forged by someone else, which is exactly the kind of supply-chain paranoia the xz-utils backdoor made painfully reasonable. In March 2024, malicious code was inserted into xz-utils through a trusted maintainer path, creating a backdoor that could affect SSH on some Linux systems, so signed commits give reviewers one extra way to verify authorship and detect suspicious changes before everyone collectively installs disaster.