ci: declare least-privilege workflow-level contents: read#392
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arpitjain099 wants to merge 1 commit into
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ci: declare least-privilege workflow-level contents: read#392arpitjain099 wants to merge 1 commit into
arpitjain099 wants to merge 1 commit into
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Declares an explicit workflow-level permissions: contents: read on 1 workflow that currently inherit the default broad read-write GITHUB_TOKEN. Each file was inspected and only reads the checkout; none publish, push, or write via the GitHub API. Post-CVE-2025-30066 hardening default. Signed-off-by: Arpit Jain <arpitjain099@gmail.com>
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Hardens 1 workflow(s) in this repo by declaring a workflow-level
permissions: contents: read. Today those workflows inherit the legacy broad read-write GITHUB_TOKEN; the read-only default reduces blast radius if any step is compromised.I checked each file - they read the checkout and run tests/lints; no GitHub API writes (no
gh pr/issue, nogit push, no release/publish/comment actions). So behavior is unchanged.Reference: the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (CVE-2025-30066) is the canonical reason to apply least-privilege defaults.