chore: sync II spec to dfinity/internet-identity release-2026-07-14

.sources/VERSIONS

@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ motoko-core           v2.4.0
 cdk-rs                ic-cdk v0.20.1 / ic-cdk-timers v1.0.0 / ic-cdk-executor v2.0.0  317f55c
 candid                2025-12-18  # candid v0.10.20, didc v0.5.4                2e4a2cf
 response-verification v3.1.0                                                    18c5a37
-internetidentity      release-2026-07-06                                         37670ecf
+internetidentity      release-2026-07-14                                         a00b4a11

public/references/internet-identity.did

@@ -1131,6 +1131,25 @@ type McpRegistration = record {
     expiration : Timestamp;
 };
 
+// Result of prepare_mcp_registration_delegation: the canister-signature public
+// key the registration delegation is rooted at (P_reg), and the (short)
+// expiration of that delegation. The frontend fetches the signed delegation via
+// get_mcp_registration_delegation and delivers the chain to the trusted MCP
+// server, which redeems it with mcp_register_v2.
+type PrepareMcpRegistrationDelegation = record {
+    user_key : UserKey;
+    expiration : Timestamp;
+};
+
+// Result of mcp_register_v2: the expiration (ns since epoch) of the MCP session
+// grant, plus the access level the user chose at connect (queries = read-only,
+// all = full). The server reads permissions to learn the read-only state up
+// front (the v2 flow has no completion POST carrying it).
+type McpRegistrationV2 = record {
+    expiration : Timestamp;
+    permissions : Permissions;
+};
+
 type GetAccountsError = variant {
     InternalCanisterError : text;
     Unauthorized : principal;
@@ -1905,6 +1924,48 @@ service : (opt InternetIdentityInit) -> {
         expiration : Timestamp
     ) -> (variant { Ok : SignedDelegation; Err : SessionDelegationError }) query;
 
+    // Mint a short-lived MCP registration delegation (P_reg -> registration_key).
+    // Authenticated as the identity (only the consenting user can create one).
+    // registration_key is an ephemeral key the II frontend generates for this
+    // connect (browser-held — the canister never delegates to a key taken from
+    // the connect link; the frontend extends the chain to the server's key
+    // browser-side). P_reg is derived from a fresh random nonce, and the whole
+    // consent — the anchor, permissions (read-only choice), max_ttl (session-
+    // grant lifetime), and the identity's current trusted-server URL — is
+    // recorded on an index entry keyed by P_reg, so mcp_register_v2 recovers it
+    // server-side and the server cannot alter any of it.
+    prepare_mcp_registration_delegation : (
+        anchor_number : UserNumber,
+        registration_key : SessionKey,
+        permissions : opt Permissions,
+        max_ttl : opt nat64
+    ) -> (variant { Ok : PrepareMcpRegistrationDelegation; Err : text });
+
+    // Fetch the signed registration delegation prepared above, to deliver to the
+    // trusted MCP server. Authenticated as the identity, like the prepare call.
+    // user_key is the value the prepare call returned; the seed is recovered
+    // from it, so no consent parameters need re-passing.
+    get_mcp_registration_delegation : (
+        anchor_number : UserNumber,
+        registration_key : SessionKey,
+        user_key : PublicKey,
+        expiration : Timestamp
+    ) -> (variant { Ok : SignedDelegation; Err : text }) query;
+
+    // Called by the trusted MCP server, authenticated by the registration
+    // delegation chain: bind the server's long-lived session_key to the
+    // consenting anchor. The entire consent — anchor, read-only choice, grant
+    // lifetime — is recovered from the entry keyed by caller() (the registration
+    // principal), so the server passes only session_key: it cannot name a
+    // different anchor, upgrade the access level or stretch the grant, and never
+    // learns the anchor number. A trusted-server switch or disable since consent
+    // invalidates the delegation. Usable until the registration delegation
+    // expires (~5 min); re-registration within that window replaces the anchor's
+    // single MCP session.
+    mcp_register_v2 : (
+        session_key : SessionKey
+    ) -> (variant { Ok : McpRegistrationV2; Err : text });
+
     get_default_account : (
         anchor_number : UserNumber,
         origin : FrontendHostname,