Potential Vulnerability in Cloned Code#166
Draft
pr-hung wants to merge 1 commit into
Draft
Conversation
frank-w
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 26, 2026
Raw Packet QPs are unique in that they support separate send and receive queues, using 2 different user-provided buffers. They can also be created with one of the queues having size 0, allowing a send-only or receive-only QP. The Raw Packet RQ umem is created in the common user QP creation path, which allows zero-length queues. Add a later validation of the RQ umem in Raw Packet QP creation path when an RQ was requested. This prevents possible null-ptr dereference crashes, as seen in the below trace: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 3539 Comm: raw_packet_umem Not tainted 6.19.0-rc1+ #166 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__mlx5_umem_find_best_quantized_pgoff+0x37/0x280 [mlx5_ib] Code: ff df 41 57 49 89 ff 41 56 41 55 41 89 d5 41 54 4d 89 cc 4c 8d 4f 30 55 4c 89 ca 48 89 f5 53 48 c1 ea 03 48 89 cb 48 83 ec 18 <80> 3c 02 00 44 89 04 24 0f 85 01 02 00 00 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc RSP: 0018:ff1100013966f4e0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000ffffffc0 RCX: 00000000ffffffc0 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 00000ffffffff000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 00000ffffffff000 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 0000000000000030 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff1100013966f648 R13: 0000000000000005 R14: ff1100013966f980 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fae6c82f740(0000) GS:ff11000898ba1000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000200000000000 CR3: 000000010f96c005 CR4: 0000000000373eb0 Call Trace: <TASK> create_qp+0x747d/0xc740 [mlx5_ib] ? is_module_address+0x18/0x110 ? _create_user_qp.constprop.0+0x18e0/0x18e0 [mlx5_ib] ? __module_address+0x49/0x210 ? is_module_address+0x68/0x110 ? static_obj+0x67/0x90 ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x58/0x200 mlx5_ib_create_qp+0xc85/0x2620 [mlx5_ib] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? create_qp+0xc740/0xc740 [mlx5_ib] ? lock_release+0xcb/0x260 ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x58/0x200 ? __init_swait_queue_head+0xcb/0x150 create_qp.part.0+0x558/0x7c0 [ib_core] ib_create_qp_user+0xa0/0x4f0 [ib_core] ? rdma_lookup_get_uobject+0x1e4/0x400 [ib_uverbs] create_qp+0xe4f/0x1d10 [ib_uverbs] ? ib_uverbs_rereg_mr+0xd40/0xd40 [ib_uverbs] ? ib_uverbs_cq_event_handler+0x120/0x120 [ib_uverbs] ? __might_fault+0x81/0x100 ? lock_release+0xcb/0x260 ? _copy_from_user+0x3e/0x90 ib_uverbs_create_qp+0x10a/0x150 [ib_uverbs] ? ib_uverbs_ex_create_qp+0xe0/0xe0 [ib_uverbs] ? __might_fault+0x81/0x100 ? lock_release+0xcb/0x260 ib_uverbs_write+0x7e5/0xc90 [ib_uverbs] ? uverbs_devnode+0xc0/0xc0 [ib_uverbs] ? lock_acquire+0xfa/0x2b0 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x189/0x6c0 vfs_write+0x1c0/0xf70 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xde/0x170 ? kernel_write+0x5a0/0x5a0 ? __switch_to+0x527/0xe60 ? __schedule+0x10a3/0x3950 ? io_schedule_timeout+0x110/0x110 ksys_write+0x170/0x1c0 ? __x64_sys_read+0xb0/0xb0 ? trace_hardirqs_off.part.0+0x4e/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x70/0x1360 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7fae6ca3118d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 5b cc 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe678ca308 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe678ca448 RCX: 00007fae6ca3118d RDX: 0000000000000070 RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffe678ca320 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 00007fae6c8ec5b8 R10: 0000000000000064 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fae6cb71000 R15: 0000000000404df0 </TASK> Modules linked in: mlx5_ib mlx5_fwctl mlx5_core bonding ip6_gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 ip_gre gre rdma_ucm ib_uverbs rdma_cm iw_cm ib_ipoib ib_cm ib_umad ib_core rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay nfnetlink zram zsmalloc fuse scsi_transport_iscsi [last unloaded: mlx5_core] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:__mlx5_umem_find_best_quantized_pgoff+0x37/0x280 [mlx5_ib] Fixes: 0fb2ed6 ("IB/mlx5: Add create and destroy functionality for Raw Packet QP") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260427-security-bug-fixes-v3-5-4621fa52de0e@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Maher Sanalla <msanalla@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Edward Srouji <edwards@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
This PR fixes a potential security vulnerability in cloned code that appears to have missed an upstream security patch.
Details
net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.cWhat this PR does
References
Please review and merge this PR to ensure your repository is protected against this potential vulnerability.
Thank you for your time !