Status honesty + real HMAC attestation; refuse fake asymmetric keys#75
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TOPOLOGY.md advertised "OVERALL 100% v1.0 Production Ready" and per-
component 100%s ("MPR security by construction proven", "audit trail
validated") while STATE.a2ml records completion 60% / CRG grade D and
READINESS.md grades the project D (Alpha, Unstable). This is the
"dashboard that lies" pattern.
- Rewrite the completion dashboard to summarise STATE.a2ml / READINESS.md
(60%, Grade D), naming the real caveats: homerolled attestation MAC,
label-only Ed25519/X25519, obliteration not guaranteed on SSD/CoW,
formal proofs pending and unlinked to the Rust.
- Add a prominent ARCHIVED banner to TESTING-REPORT.adoc (a stale
2025-12-29 snapshot whose "all tests passed / robust" framing overstates
current status), pointing readers to READINESS.md / STATE.a2ml.
No code changes; documentation truthfulness only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015qwVESTcbfanY2iJPQNoSz
…etric keys Two honesty/security fixes flagged by the threat model and STATE.a2ml. B3 — attestation MAC: - Replace the homerolled `SHA256(key || data || previous_hash)` (not a MAC; banned by the Trustfile `no-homerolled-hmac` invariant) with a real HMAC-SHA256 via the `hmac` crate (RFC 2104), with a versioned scheme label bound in as a domain separator (januskey.attestation.HMAC-SHA256.v1). - `compute_attestation` now returns Result and hard-errors when no key is set, removing the `unwrap_or([0u8; 32])` all-zero-key fallback that silently produced forgeable, unkeyed attestations. - Producer (log_event) and verifier (verify_integrity) both propagate the error, so they stay consistent. B4 — fake asymmetric crypto: - `SecretKey::generate()` only ever produces 32 random bytes and ignores the algorithm, so selecting ed25519/x25519 yielded a random blob merely labelled "Ed25519"/"X25519" — not a keypair. Refuse generation of these types at the CLI with a clear "not implemented" error. Enum variants are retained (documented as reserved/unimplemented) so historical serialized metadata and audit entries still deserialize. Regression tests added: test_attestation_refused_without_key, test_attestation_is_genuinely_keyed (wrong key fails verification — a plain hash would not catch this, proving the MAC is genuinely keyed). Verified: `cargo build -p januskey` clean; `cargo test -p januskey --lib` 26 passed / 0 failed; attestation E2E + P2P chain-integrity tests pass. STATE.a2ml blockers updated (homerolled-hmac RESOLVED). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015qwVESTcbfanY2iJPQNoSz
The `audit` CI job (cargo audit --deny warnings / --deny unmaintained) denied on two advisories, both pre-existing and unrelated to the crypto change on this branch. Resolve them at the source rather than ignoring: - Bump indicatif 0.17 -> 0.18: 0.18 drops the `number_prefix` dependency entirely, clearing RUSTSEC-2025-0119 (number_prefix unmaintained). Only ProgressBar + ProgressStyle::default_bar() are used here, stable across the bump; `cargo build -p januskey` is clean on 0.18.6. - Update anyhow 1.0.102 -> 1.0.103, the patched release for RUSTSEC-2026-0190 (unsound Error::downcast_mut). That API is not called anywhere in this codebase in any case. number_prefix is now absent from Cargo.lock; anyhow is 1.0.103. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015qwVESTcbfanY2iJPQNoSz
Four CI checks failed on every PR (and on main) for reasons unrelated to any code change — the "CI that cannot pass" problem. Fix each: - rust-ci.yml: the job calls the shared reusable rust-ci-reusable.yml with no `with:` block, so its required `toolchain` input was empty and the "parse toolchain version" step failed with `'toolchain' is a required input`. Pass `toolchain: stable` (matches .tool-versions and the dtolnay/rust-toolchain pins in e2e.yml). - tests/aspect/cross_cutting_test.sh: the Documentation check asserted README.adoc, but the repo ships README.md (root .adoc is EXPLAINME.adoc). Accept either; aspect suite now PASS 29 / FAIL 0. - cargo-audit.yml create-issue: `needs: audit` + `if: failure()` ran on PR events where GITHUB_TOKEN is read-only, so `gh issue create` 403'd. Guard with `&& github.event_name != 'pull_request'`; issues are still filed on push/schedule runs. Both workflow files keep their SPDX line-1 header and top-level permissions block (workflow-linter.yml requirements); YAML validated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015qwVESTcbfanY2iJPQNoSz
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What & why
Two related honesty problems flagged by the survey, threat model, and
STATE.a2ml: dashboards that overstate status, and cryptography that isn't what its labels claim.Changes
B1 — status reconciliation (docs)
TOPOLOGY.mdadvertised "OVERALL 100% v1.0 Production Ready" whileSTATE.a2mlrecords 60% / CRG grade D andREADINESS.mdgrades it D (Alpha, Unstable). Rewrote the completion dashboard to summarise the real state and name the actual caveats (homerolled MAC, label-only asymmetric crypto, obliteration not guaranteed on SSD/CoW, formal proofs pending).TESTING-REPORT.adoc(2025-12-29) whose "all tests passed / robust" framing overstates status.B3 — real attestation MAC (code)
SHA256(key || data || previous_hash)(not a MAC; banned by Trustfileno-homerolled-hmac) with a real HMAC-SHA256 (hmaccrate, RFC 2104) with a versioned domain separator.compute_attestationnow returnsResultand hard-errors when no key is set, removing theunwrap_or([0u8; 32])all-zero-key fallback that silently produced forgeable attestations. Producer and verifier both propagate the error.B4 — no fake asymmetric crypto (code)
SecretKey::generate()only produces 32 random bytes and ignores the algorithm, soed25519/x25519yielded a random blob merely labelled asymmetric. Generation of these types is now refused at the CLI with a clear "not implemented" error. Enum variants are retained (documented reserved/unimplemented) for backward-compatible deserialization.Verification
cargo build -p januskey— clean (pre-existing dead-code warnings only).cargo test -p januskey --lib— 26 passed / 0 failed; attestation E2E + P2P chain-integrity pass.test_attestation_refused_without_key,test_attestation_is_genuinely_keyed(wrong key fails verification — proves the MAC is genuinely keyed, which a plain hash would not catch).STATE.a2mlblockers updated (homerolled-hmac→ RESOLVED).Context
Tasks B1/B3/B4 of a broader estate assessment. Draft pending human review. Note: on-disk audit logs written under the old homerolled scheme will not verify under the new versioned MAC (intentional, alpha-stage).
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_015qwVESTcbfanY2iJPQNoSz
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