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ci: supply-chain & secrets hardening — SHA-pin actions, Dependabot, zizmor, gitleaks (closes #11)#20

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claude/supply-chain-hardening
Jun 18, 2026
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ci: supply-chain & secrets hardening — SHA-pin actions, Dependabot, zizmor, gitleaks (closes #11)#20
VijitSingh97 merged 1 commit into
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claude/supply-chain-hardening

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Resolves #11 — the same supply-chain hardening pithead/rigforge already have, sized to this repo. This repo ships no app dependencies, so the surface is the workflows themselves, which were the least-hardened in the org.

What this does

1. Pin every Action by commit SHA (with # vX.Y.Z comments, mirroring rigforge):

Action Pin
actions/checkout df4cb1c… # v6.0.3
actions/configure-pages 45bfe01… # v6.0.0
actions/upload-pages-artifact fc324d3… # v5.0.0
actions/deploy-pages cd2ce8f… # v5.0.0

Plus persist-credentials: false on checkouts (zizmor: artipacked).

2. Scope deploy.yml permissions per-job — the build job is now read-only; only the deploy job carries pages: write + id-token: write (was granted repo-wide). Also pass the Pages base_url via env: instead of inline expansion (template-injection).

3. .github/dependabot.yml — tracks the github-actions ecosystem only (weekly, grouped rollup) to keep the SHA pins current and surface advisories. No pip/npm/docker ecosystems exist here; Hugo is wget-pinned and stays manual (#15).

4. .github/workflows/security.yml — two gates, mirroring rigforge:

  • gitleaks full-history secret scan on every push/PR (pinned + checksum-verified).
  • zizmor workflow audit on push/PR + a weekly schedule (online advisory cross-check against actions we pin).

5. .pre-commit-config.yaml — gitleaks hook pinned in lockstep with CI, documented in CONTRIBUTING under Secret scanning.

Verified locally

  • gitleaks git . --redactno leaks across all 19 commits of history (so the new gate is green, not red on its own PR).
  • zizmor .github/workflows/no findings.

Acceptance (#11)

  • All workflow actions pinned by SHA with # vX.Y.Z comments
  • .github/dependabot.yml (github-actions) live
  • zizmor clean
  • gitleaks gate in CI + pre-commit hook

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

The workflows were the least-hardened surface in the org (this repo ships no
app dependencies). Bring them in line with pithead/rigforge.

- Pin all GitHub Actions by commit SHA with `# vX.Y.Z` comments
  (checkout v6.0.3, configure-pages v6.0.0, upload-pages-artifact v5.0.0,
  deploy-pages v5.0.0); add `persist-credentials: false` on checkouts.
- deploy.yml: scope permissions per-job — the build job is read-only; only
  the deploy job gets pages:write + id-token:write (was repo-wide). Pass the
  Pages base_url via env instead of inline expansion (template-injection).
- .github/dependabot.yml: track the github-actions ecosystem (weekly,
  grouped) to keep the SHA pins current.
- .github/workflows/security.yml: gitleaks full-history secret scan + zizmor
  workflow audit (online advisory cross-check), mirroring rigforge.
- .pre-commit-config.yaml: gitleaks hook pinned in lockstep with CI; document
  it in CONTRIBUTING under "Secret scanning".

Verified locally: gitleaks reports no leaks across history; zizmor reports
no findings on the workflows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@VijitSingh97 VijitSingh97 merged commit fe61e90 into main Jun 18, 2026
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@VijitSingh97 VijitSingh97 deleted the claude/supply-chain-hardening branch June 18, 2026 06:31
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tooling: supply-chain & secrets hardening (SHA-pin actions, Dependabot, zizmor, gitleaks)

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