Report suspected vulnerabilities in actdata-plugins privately, never through a public GitHub
issue.
Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository ("Security" tab, then "Report a vulnerability") if it is enabled. That flow creates a private draft advisory visible only to maintainers and gives you a secure channel to attach reproduction detail.
If it is not enabled here, report through Patterson's internal security contact.
Caution
[TBD: the Patterson-wide security contact or mailbox has not been recorded in this repository.] Do not report a vulnerability publicly while this is unresolved — escalate
through your normal Patterson security channel instead.
Please include, where you can:
- The affected plugin, skill, agent, command, or script.
- Reproduction steps or a minimal example.
- The potential impact as you understand it — what an attacker could actually do, not just what looks unusual.
- The plugin manifests, skills, agents, and commands under
plugins/. .claude-plugin/marketplace.json— in particular anything that would cause an agent to install or trust something unintended.- The validator scripts under
scripts/and the CI configuration under.github/. - This repository's supply chain. It currently has a near-empty dependency footprint, and the two
validators in
scripts/deliberately import onlynode:*builtins so the gate itself is not a supply-chain surface.
A plugin in this repository is mostly instructions to an agent. A malicious or careless edit to
a SKILL.md, an agent system prompt, or a slash command is not inert text — it changes what an
agent will do on someone else's machine, with that person's credentials.
Treat the following as security-relevant, not merely stylistic:
- Instructions that tell an agent to exfiltrate file contents, environment variables, or credentials to any network destination.
- Instructions that suppress confirmation prompts, or that encourage running commands without showing them to the user.
- A hook that blocks or rewrites tool calls without a documented off switch.
- An MCP server configured over plain HTTP or WS rather than HTTPS or WSS.
- An absolute path where
${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}belongs — it can point at a directory the plugin author did not intend on a different machine.
Before adding or upgrading any third-party package:
socket package shallow npm pkg:npm/<name>@<version> --markdownFlag anything scoring under 90 on any of the five dimensions (supply chain, maintenance, quality,
vulnerability, license) and get confirmation before installing. Read the [high]/[middle]/[low]
alerts line as well.
- Vulnerabilities in ACT Data products or infrastructure that a plugin here happens to describe. Report those through the normal channel for that system.
- Upstream defects in Anthropic's
plugin-dev, from whichplugins/act-plugin-dev/is forked. Report those to Anthropic. If a defect has security impact as vendored here, report it here as well so the fork can be patched independently.
This repository does not commit to a response-time service level agreement.
[TBD: no vulnerability-response SLA has been set for this repository.] Reports are triaged by the
owning team in CODEOWNERS for the affected path.